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I. Introduction
In its stormy career upon this planet, nuclear energy has astounded, terrified,
and sobered mankind. Today, thirty years since its dramatic introduction on the
global stage, it is hailed at once as our nemesis and savior. In its darker dimen-
sions, one-thirty-millionth of an ounce of a common nuclear material can destroy
a man; as few as eight diverted kilograms of the same substance can annihilate a
metropolis or agonizingly poison far greater regions; the meltdown of a large
reactor could mean the desertion of entire regions for years.I Alternatively the
identical material can cleanly energize a city and vastly reduce the consumption
of other energy resources.
The rapid emergence of this nuclear phenomenon puts to an extreme test the
prescription expressed many years ago by Lord Mansfield: "[Als the usages of
society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind." 2 To
what extent has the law adapted, or, indeed, is it capable of adapting, to solve the
deep environmental, socio-economic, and political problems underlying global
control of nuclear energy? Effective global regulation of nuclear power must be of
visceral concern to the international and environmental lawyer. Current
regulatory practices intone grave images of instability, irresponsibility, and
danger. Resolution of the problem cannot come unilaterally: one nation could
never control a technology that is shared by several of the world powers. It is a
transnational problem calling for a transnational solution.
This essay attempts a broadly-based examination of global nuclear energy
problems. Rather than relying upon a detailed analysis of one issue it conveys the
spectrum of issues which confront transnational efforts at control. It does so upon
*Mr. Pattison is a legal clerk and a student at Boston University.
'For more detailed examinations of these dangers see International Atomic Energy Agency,
Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power Stations (1970), hereinafter Environmental Aspects:
Report of the Secretary-General on the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc.A/6858 (1967).
2Barwell v. Brooks. 3 Doug. 371. 373 (1784).
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the premise that efforts focusing upon only one band of that spectrum are
inherently doomed. The interaction of these issues is inescapable; the law can
resolve the extant problem only through a synthetic approach which
acknowledges this interaction and complexity.
A. Projections of Nuclear Energy Utilization
In the world today there are approximately 425 nuclear power plants in opera-
tion or under construction. Reasonable projections of this figure have estimated a
total of 2,000 power reactors by the year 2000. Exhaustive international study of
the 1981-1990 decade in the developing countries, moreover, has revealed a
market projection of 335 power units producing 220,000 megawatts in those
countries alone.3
The United States, Canada, South Africa and the Soviet Union will play
pivotal roles as major uranium suppliers in this development. Yet the vital roles
remain for those exporting nuclear technology: West Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Sweden and the Soviet Union; in
the next five years these nations will direct a 40 to 50 billion dollar nuclear export
business.4 It is thus apparent that within a few years today's developing countries
will have enough fissionable material to manufacture thousands of bombs
annually. It is equally indisputable that reactors to date have produced 45,000
kilograms of the most poisonous substance known to man, that the substance,
plutonium, is being generated rapidly throughout the world, and that each gram
produced will remain hazardous to its environment for over 100,000 years. s
B. Global Implications of Nuclear
Energy Development
Although it is not inconceivable that Compton was correct in noting that its
"eventual importance to mankind . . .can hardly be less than that of fire,' 6
nuclear energy is infinitely more destructive than traditional combustion. Its
speculated agenda of misuse and Armageddon is well publicized; tales of its more
negative capabilities are legion. It is beyond the scope of this endeavor to
document them.
Yet three distinct areas of concern underlie any inquiry into transnational
control: 1) proliferation of reprocessing technology and subsequent diversion of
'International Atomic Energy Agency, Market Study of Nuclear Power in Developing Countries
19 (1974), hereinafter Market Study; for further discussion of current and projected utilization, see
Environmental Aspects, supra, at 5; New York Times, 14 July 1974, IV at 17:3.4New York Times, 17 August 1975, at 1:1; Japan, Italy, and Switzerland are also showing interest
in entering the market. It should be further noted that significant uranium supplies lie also in
Gabon, Australia, India, and Brazil.
'The half-life of plutonium is 24,360 years.
'A. H. COMPTON, ATOMIC QUEST (1956).
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weapons material by governments; 2) diversion of weapons materials by
terrorists; and 3) inherent environmental risks of nuclear energy.
The reality of the above three problems must be focused: In 1974 India diverted
materials from a Canada-supplied reactor to explode a bomb near the Pakistani
border despite an explicit agreement against such use. 7 France has recently sold
to Pakistan the reprocessing technology necessary for an active weapons
program.' In 1975, the United States narrowly averted a French-South Korean
arrangement for supplying that Asian country with similar weapons capability. 9
Recent intelligence reports acknowledge a clandestine Israeli reprocessing plant
which has produced an estimated ten to twenty nuclear bombs through materials
from its French-built, unregulated Dimona reactor, as well as a clandestine
reprocessing facility in Taiwan. 10 Negotiations for similar reprocessing plants are
underway with the French in the volatile state of Argentina, and have been
completed between West Germany and Brazil, where, after fierce international
competition for reactor sales, the Germans clinched the 4 billion dollar sale by
offering the "bonus" of a reprocessing plant. 11
Diversion by nongovernment groups likewise looms real as reports are filed in
the nation of the world's most stringent nuclear controls-the United States-of
two incidents of reactor employees smuggling out enough fissionable material for
weapons manufacture."2 At the same time a high Nuclear Regulatory
Commission official confides that a single power reactor was unable to account
for 4,100 kilograms of enriched uranium. I
Environmental risks, notably from reactor meltdowns, carry the most popular
concern: WASH 1400, the recent Reactor Safety Study, estimates the probability
of such meltdown today to be approximately t in 20,000 per reactor per year. 14 In
the world of 2,000 reactors projected by the end of the century such statistics
indicate a terrifying possibility unless further steps are taken for transnational
control of nuclear safety.
'Agreement between Canada and India on Atomic Energy, December 6, 1963, Can. T.S. No. 10;
529 U.N.T.S. 45 (No. 7655). In essence the treaty provided that
1) The fissionable material used in the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes.
2) No material produced by the reactor would be transferred beyond Indian jurisdiction.
3) Canada would be notified in advance of the disposition of nuclear material.
4) Records of materials used would be maintained to ensure accountability.
5) Canadian representatives would be given inspection rights at the reactor.
6) Quarterly reports of reactor activity would be issued.
'Although reprocessing provides an important link in the recycling of nuclear fuels, its huge
expense is not justified by Pakistan's small power program.
'New York Times, 15 June 1975, at 1, col. 5.
"°New York Times, 30 Aug. 1975, at 1:4; Boston Globe, 10 March 1976 at 1:5.
"New York Times, 15 June 1975, at 1:5.
"New York Times, 29 December 1975, at 26:1.
'Ibid.
'Ibid. at § 2.11.
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H. Transnatlonal Regulatory Framework
A. Bilateral Treaties
Since 1955, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada" have
exported nuclear technology under bilateral agreements with recipient countries.
The United States, as the most active exporter, shapes its agreements in accord-
ance with the requirements of § 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which
demands guaranties by the cooperating party that "security safeguards and
standards ... be maintained" and that appurtenant materials "will not be used
for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for
any other military purpose." 1 6 Similar guaranties are called for in Canadian and
British export treaties.II
The principal characteristic of these bilateral agreements is their delegation"
-as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty-of all safeguard activities to the
IAEA. Sanctions against recipients who violate these safeguards are based upon
the general principle of international law allowing suspension of a breached
treaty; ' 9 yet major exporters, for political reasons, have proven hesitant to carry
out such sanctions. Moreover, the fact that recipient countries can turn to
exporters that have shown themselves less discriminate-and less responsible-
in the global nuclear market, e.g., West Germany, France, and the Soviet
Union,20 severely limits the utility of bilateral agreements in general
transnational control.
B. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
In March 1970 the most comprehensive attempt at the implementation of
global safeguards was effected in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. The treaty prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by any
non-weapon signatory, calls for all non-weapon parties to accept IAEA safe-
guards on all peaceful nuclear activity, and requires all members to submit any
nuclear exports to non-weapon states, including non-signatories, to IAEA safe-
guards. 1 The treaty contains no enforcement provisions beyond those
"Other exporters similarly use bilateral agreements in their trade; the dominance of these three
in nuclear trade simply makes them of the most consequence.
1"42 U.S.C. § 2153(a).
'See note 7, supra.
"Bilateral treaties executed before the signing of the IAEA Statute have been generally amended
to incorporate IAEA safeguards.
"See Restatement (Second) ofthe Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 158(a) and (c); 5 Moos,
DIOEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 356-58 (1906).
"West Germany and France are not members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus not
bound to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports. The Soviet Union has practiced a policy
which allows wide discretion in any recipient nation over use of nuclear materials.
"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968 (1970) 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
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incorporated by use of the IAEA, and significantly the parties most likely and
most capable of developing nuclear weapons, including Japan, Pakistan and
South Africa, are non-signatories. Furthermore, Israel, India and China are not
members nor are the increasingly active exporting nations of France and West
Germany.22 One observer has pointed out that a nation could easily employ the
treaty to receive nuclear equipment and then withdraw with the requisite ninety-
day notice to develop a belligerent technology."
C. The International Atomic Energy Agency
The heated debate and cold war following the failure of the Baruch Plan 24 ulti-
mately led to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan presented at the
U.N. in December of 1953. The plan proposed an International Atomic Energy
Agency which despite initial Soviet opposition became an independent Vienna-
based organization in 1957 with a membership that included the Soviet Union
and all other major powers except the People's Republic of China. The 106
nations currently participating in the Agency form a General Conference which
elects a Board of Governors and a Director General to fulfill the Agency's
mandate:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure so far as it is able,
that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not
used in such a way as to further any military purpose."
The central characteristic of the Agency is that it exists as a regulatory frame-
work which "floats" in the transnational legal structure, becoming activated only
when fastened to separate legal instruments between nations or when a nation
accepts Agency benefits such as research materials. The obligation to submit to
Agency jurisdiction, then, has risen chiefly through bilateral export agreements
or multilateral instruments, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most
prominent.
The Agency's main task is to apply "safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information
... are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." 26 These "safe-
"O0ther important non-signers include Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Pakistan, and Spain.
3 M. WILLRICH, GLOBAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 180 (1971), hereafter GLOBAL
POLITICS.
"This plan proposed by U.N. Representative Baruch envisioned an "International Atomic
Development Authority" which would have managerial control of worldwide nuclear activity and
materials.
"Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956 (1957), 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, Article II, hereinafter Statute.
16Ibid.
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guards," although the marrow of the international control system, are extremely
nebulous, being defined both in the IAEA Statute and IAEA practice as only
measures "designed to ensure" peaceful use of nuclear energy. "1 In fulfilling this
safeguard function the Agency operated within its staff of 1,000 a seventy-
member inspection force. These inspectors conduct inspections of facilities,
employing sophisticated auditing techniques designed to detect discrepancies in
nuclear materials records. Although this auditing is the primary focus of
inspection activity, further detention devices recently developed include seals in
storage vaults, cameras, and neutron detectors which monitor the power level of a
reactor and movement of irradiated fuel. 2
8
Significantly, the invocation of IAEA safeguards in any agreement thus in-
volves the admission of foreign nationals-the inspectors-to nuclear facilities.
Such a surrender of national sovereignty, however slight, represents an important
movement toward the transnational focus envisioned by the Agency founders.
Should a diversion or other violation of a specific operative treaty be discovered by
these inspectors, however, the Agency's sanctions consist solely of demanding
compliance and reporting the violation to the U.N. If compliance is not effected,
the Agency may suspend its own technical assistance and demand return of
nuclear materials. 29
A vital consideration lies in acknowledgment of the IAEA's fundamental role
as a nuclear energy promoter. Prior to creation of the Agency, emphasis in
international forums lay primarily upon control of nuclear energy. The Agency
statute, however, reflected a reordering of priorities by providing an extremely
broad base for promotion and development under IAEA guidance. Indicative of
this are the open framework for research promotion in the Statute itsel 0 as well
as the ten to fifteen annual symposia sponsored by the Agency, the 30,000 pages
of technical information published annually by it, the seventeen major IAEA
technical assistance projects, and the International Nuclear Information System
(INIS) of the Agency which utilizes a computer network for the distribution of
nuclear technology to forty-seven nations.31
2An obvious problem this lies in identifying the concept of "safeguards"; IAEA practice, as
noted in the text, provides the essential definition. Thus safeguard systems are simply systems
designed to detect diversion of materials from peaceful to military use. Prevention of diversion is not
embraced by the IAEA Statute or practice; prevention measures thus lie only with individual nations
in regard to terrorist diversion and international pressure with regard to governmental diversion.
Prevention measures promulgated by the former AEC are found at 10 C.F.R. §§ 50, 70, 73. For a
broader discussion of IAEA safeguard practice see A. McKNIGHT, ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS 196
(1971), hereinafter ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS.
2 See New York Times, 11 May 1975, at 19:1.
2 Statute, supra, note 25, at Article XII.
"Ibid., at Articles III, VIII, IX, and XI.
IIIAEA Director General, Statement of ECOSOC, July 1975, IAEA Doc. E/5679/ at 4 (1975),
hereinafter ECOSOC.
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III. Issues of Transnational Control
A. Socio-Economic Dilemmas
Notwithstanding the oft-discussed complex economic inquiries which are
beyond the scope of this article, distinct but relatively unfamiliar issues surround
the collision of the pre-industrial or developing society with the spectre of nuclear
energy. As development continues toward the 335 new developing-country
reactors of the next decade vast amounts of foreign capital, expertise, and general
influence will be pumped into these societies. Due to the extreme capital-
intensive nature of reactor projects, which discourages private capital, the
financial influx will largely be from foreign governments and quasi-government
financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank. Expertise will similarly
flow from governments and multinational corporations of America and Western
Europe. The influx of such influence poses serious problems of distortion of
indigenous decision-making and other societal processes.
Formal controls designed to combat this nebulous problem should probably go
no further than to limit the role of foreign interests in indigenous decision-
making; closer scrutiny of the role of multinational corporations in such societies
obviously would be one such measure. Yet the creation of devices for the simple
enunciation of such problems by perhaps an organized group of sociologists and
even anthropologists would go far in serving such societies. Few have openly
asked whether the rush into nuclear development meets the best total interests of
such populations, whether nuclear development and its concomitant global
responsibilities is the most intelligent immediate path. Hidden among the
periodic nuclear energy scares, the indigenous decision-making apparatus of
such nations, the race for development, the intermittent calls for reactor
moratoriums, the spirited protest demonstrations, may well be a subtle
"sociology" of nuclear energy-part of a broader sociology of twentieth century
"progress," the study of which could only benefit world development.
B. Political Response
Typically the political controls found in the NPT, the bilateral agreements, and
the IAEA Statute grew from sound, responsible ideas which by a formula of
global politics were rendered impotent once enacted. Epitomizing this is the
amendment to the latest foreign aid authorization approved by Congress that
bars aid to any country that builds a reprocessing plant. The law is riddled with
loopholes, including a presidential waiver authority, to such an extent that the
section becomes no more than the dreamy expression of a spineless nuclear
policy.
Thus it is that policies other than control dominate transnational nuclear
development. Exporting nations find extensions of their foreign influence and
tools of international diplomacy in nuclear facility exports. Recipient states find
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in such facilities instant world status symbols, increased stature for incumbent
leaders, and decoys away from strained domestic situations. Yet beyond these
obvious misuses of nuclear energy in political powerplays there exists a deep
problem on the political scene: a vast confusion of roles and institutional
responsibilities in the structure of global nuclear policy.
The domestic situation in the United States provides a revealing microcosm of
this dilemma. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews and has veto power
over all nuclear export licenses in the United States under the Atomic Energy Act
and the Energy Reorganization Act. 32 Importantly this role fell to the NRC and
not to the Energy Research and Development Administration in the 1974
reorganization of the old AEC; this was due to the strong congressional
sentiment (as evidenced as 42 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.) for separation of
promotional and regulatory functions so that an exclusive expert and technically
informed agency could perform the regulatory functions. Clearly the export of
nuclear technology, in light of safety, safeguarding and fuel demand33 problems,
should fall naturally to an agency with non-political expertise in nuclear develop-
ment. Yet the NRC often stumbles in this role, deferring to the executive branch
for leadership. The Commission Chairman himself has complained that he feels
his role as essentially the supervisor of nuclear exports is inappropriate for the
head of an independent agency, that such responsibilities are so engulfed in
foreign policy that they should belong to the State Department." At the same
time State Department officials warn of the complex technological issues involved
in such exports, making them improper subjects for lay scrutiny. In the midst of
this confusion members of Congress have claimed that Congress itself has
abdicated its responsibilities in this area far too much to the State Department
and the Export-Import Bank.3"
History has evidenced again and again that political institutions tend to
insulate technological advancement from the processes for change. Thus nuclear
reactors are exported in the contexts of political stratagems rather than directed
toward the welfare of the recipient nation. Political interests vesting in, for
example, the development of plutonium reprocessing technology as a diplomatic
tool, not only feed huge expenditures into it and protect it from opposing interests
which could bring fresh approaches such as regional reprocessing plants, but use
it to serve almost exclusively political concerns. Thus France has sold and
3242 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.: 42 U.S.C. § 580 et seq., respectively.
"The fuel demand of various reactors becomes an important technical consideration in balancing
fuel recycling problems--e.g., what effect will an export have on reprocessing plant in the U.S.
which will be used for recycling of materials used therein?
"
4Such an attitude has not only been enunciated but is obvious in many of the Commission's
actions. See New York Times, 10 March 1976 at 6:3; New York Times, 8 March 1976, at 38:1; Boston
Globe, 10 March 1976 at 1:5.
11120 CONG. REC. H7434 (daily ed. 31 July 1974).
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Pakistan purchased a reprocessing plant which is completely impractical for
Pakistan's fuel cycle needs. Senator Ribicoff has indirectly addressed this
problem by calling for a new approach against the West German and French veto
of a ban on reprocessing plant sales; the Senator suggested an appeal "over the
heads of the leaders to the people of France and Germany." 6 As impractical as
the statement may be, it represents an almost subconscious realization of the
extent to which political institutions have insulated the real problems of nuclear
development from the forces of rational change. The essence of the problem is
clear: the institutional interests which ultimately benefit from nuclear energy, the
interests that recognize the strengths and weaknesses of safeguards, are not the
interests that promulgate nuclear energy."
C. Administrative Weaknesses
The IAEA joins the ranks of most other international governmental organiza-
tions in failing to follow the authoritative course envisioned by its creators. Along
with other inadequacies already touched upon, the fate of the initial central focus
on the Agency as a world broker of nuclear materials is demonstrative of this
failure. Despite the major weight placed on this brokerage role at the birth of the
Agency, nearly twenty years elapsed before it could announce that it had actually
served as a channel in supplying fuel to power reactors, and then only to small
units in Mexico and Yugoslavia. 38 Notwithstanding such problems, however, the
IAEA legal framework could provide a realtively strong global management
system if properly exercised. In identifying the problems to be solved beyond the
promotional-control dichotomy, basic concern must focus upon the Agency
inspectorate, the orientation and practice of safeguards, and the IAEA financial
basis.
1. THE AGENCY INSPECTORATE
The IAEA inspectors, "who shall have access at all times to all places and
data... to determine whether there is compliance"39 with safeguards, could in
theory be a major regulatory force. The seventy-member inspectorate today
follows Agency regulations which set the frequency of inspections according to
the kilograms of nuclear material employed in a given reactor, providing up to
five visits per year for small reactors and unlimited inspections for the largest
units. These same regulations order one week's notice for routine inspections and
"Boston Globe, 10 March 1976, at 1:5.
" n simplest terms-though perhaps oversimplified-this means that the scientists and the
consumers who best know the true costs and benefits of nuclear power are, to large extent, not
included in the decision-making process which spreads nuclear development.
"ECOSOC, supra, note 31.
"IAEA Statute, supra, note 25, Article XII.
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twenty-four-hour notice for the rare "special" inspections warranted by unusual
circumstances."0 Yet nothing less than spontaneous inspection could reveal the
true operational mode of any facility, particularly certain reprocessing plants
from which materials could feasibly be diverted in a matter of hours. Further-
more, IAEA statistics reveal that no more than half the maximum allowable
inspections are ever performed.4 1 As has also been pointed out by an IAEA
official, the vital materials records which support the inspection system do not
flow continuously but come periodically, even sporadically, resulting in audits
based on figures that may be up to 150 days old.4 1 Most alarming of all is the fact
that the current inspection force is severely undermanned. Realistic projections
made by the U.S. Congress for the year 1975 and based solely on IAEA enforce-
ment of its Non-Proliferation Treaty mandate called for an inspection force not of
70 but rather 755 inspectors. 43 The rigorous global inspection process inherent in
effective international control necessitates a vast increase in the strength of the
inspectorate.
2. SAFEGUARD FOCUS AND APPLICATION
Serious questions must also be directed towards safeguard practice,
specifically towards both their general scope and their current application. It is
paradoxical that while safeguards are aimed at nuclear facilities alone, the
dangers they are designed to prevent may easily occur outside of such facilities;
more precisely, the transportation of fissionable materials between reprocessing
plants and reactors is keenly susceptible to the same diversion problems as
facilities, perhaps even more so in regard to terrorist activity. As reactors multiply
and the fuel cycle process greatly expands, the problem will acquire awesome
dimensions: it is estimated that in twenty years, at current trends, there will be
enough fissionable material in transit at any point in time to manufacture 20,000
nuclear bombs." Contemporary practice leaves such transit problems in the
hands of domestic governments in the assumption that mere security problems
need be no concern of an international organization. Yet without sufficient
guarantees of uniformly high security precautions throughout the world, an
in-transit diversion becomes a very likely threat over the course of the next few
years. Obviously the highly-trained inspection force need not fill the role of armed
guards; yet just as obviously an international security force seems imperative.45
'"Ibid.
41P. SzAsz, TH LAw AND PRACTICE OF TH IAEA 611 (1970), IAEA Legal Series No. 7.
'
2LoVETr, NUCLEAR MATERIALS, ACCOUNTABILITY, MANAGEMENT, SAFEGUARDS 281,
American Nuclear Society Monograph (1974), hereinafter LOVET'.
'
3GLOBAL POLITICS, supra, note 23 at 88.
"New York Times, 11 May 1975, IV at 19:1.
4'For a brief discussion of this problem see ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS, supra, note 273, at 142. The
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Parallel considerations must be given the basic definition of safeguards. The
risks of nuclear energy entail more than division; its environmental dangers are
equally as serious. In a very real sense the dangers of radioactivity in material
transit, in reactors and reprocessing plants, in waste disposal, and, to a lesser
extent, in uranium mining and processing are of an unavoidably global
character. 46 Failure to recognize this fact will penalize every living creature on the
planet. Beyond disjointed regulatory attempts by various UN organizations,
there exists no real international effort to control this radioactivity. IAEA safe-
guards are firmly centered upon prevention of military use of nuclear materials.
Yet true international control must embrace prevention of all the dangers
inherent in international nuclear activity. Current safeguard definition or scope
thus seems inadequate in any broad, long-range analysis. The problem calls for
profound redefinition of the "safeguard" concept; its solution will be difficult due
to the inertia of a thirty-year focus on military dangers alone.
More immediate concern must lie with the quality of safeguard application
even in this military orientation. Comprehensive analysis of safeguard applica-
tion has filled volumes already"' and must be reserved for more technically
oriented writers. Yet the system of auditing materials inventories remains
questionable to even a cursory glance. A single example of the myriad problems
adhering to safeguard application today sufficiently raises the issue.
In the IAEA inspections designed to alert the world to significant losses of
nuclear materials, practice calls for concluding that no theft or environmentally
dangerous loss occurred if the Materials Unaccounted For (MUF) can be
explained by any measurement uncertainties or mistakes possibly stemming from
earlier inventories. As a result there have been thousands of pounds of
plutonium and enriched uranium written off as MUF; knowledgeable observers
consider them to be diverted.49
3. THE IAEA FINANCIAL BASIS
The most fundamental criticism of global control of nuclear energy must be
reserved for the level of commitment as evidenced by the financial foundation of
the IAEA. As fifty billion dollars in nuclear trade looms worldwide, twenty-eight
U.S. Congress has shown interest in a formal national nuclear security force at 42 U.S.C. § 5844,
which commissions a study of the problem.
4The strontium presently within all human bones (from nuclear fallout) throughout the world
solemnly attests to the global implications of weapons testing; the wind and water currents which
can carry radioactive leakages in peaceful uses mean that fissionable materials everywhere must be
controlled.
47See e.g., ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS, supra, note 27; LOvETT, supra, note 42; Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute, Safeguards Against Nuclear Proliferation (1975), hereinafter
SIPRI.
"LOVETT, supra, note 42, at 35.
"See New York Times, 14 July 1975, IV at 17:3.
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of the Agency nations pay the annual sum of 754 dollars for the international
control system. 50 The vast proportion of the Agency budget is provided for by a
few Western nations: the United States alone pays 27 percent of the annual $29.6
million budget, plus another $5.7 million in technical assistance.5"
Such fiscal practices render the Agency an international placebo. The budget is
based upon a long-debated per-capita formula serving a certain notion of
equality.52 Yet the global commitment cannot be credible until the effort is
adequately financed on a scale equitable to all concerns. A scale contoured to the
whimpers of less-developed countries who otherwise scream for more power on
the international scene is not the answer.
IV. Proposals
A. Strengthening of the IAEA
Ideally the world situation calls for bold new approaches and legal institutions
to bring nuclear energy under effective transnational control; indeed, this has
been inherent throughout the foregoing discussion and will be discussed subse-
quently. Viable efforts to reform the current regulatory scheme must first focus,
however, upon the IAEA. Despite its deficiencies it remains the only practical
vehicle for transnational control; its extant framework could support the far-
reaching network of control originally envisioned in the IAEA Statute.
Immediate reformation must center upon the obvious administrative weaknesses
as outlined above: 1) financial commitment to control efforts; 2) inspectorate
strength; 3) quality and scope of safeguards; and 4) dichotomy in Agency roles.
The IAEA financial basis as a determinative factor of reform deserves primary
consideration. The total political responsibility to the international problems
necessarily includes fiscal responsibility. Yet responsibility is clearly not fostered
when a large portion of the participating nations pitch relative pennies into the
international budget. A vigorous financial realignment and universal
shouldering of increased responsibility in the Agency is imperative. An important
part of this effort may lie in making the cost of safeguarding a particular reactor a
part of the total cost paid by the nation using the facility; the sum of such
safeguards would represent no more than a fraction of one percent of the value of
electricity produced in a given reactor. 5"
Concomitantly the international inspectorate must be increased to the point
where the concept of resident inspectors with spontaneous inspection rights is a
reality. This idea, not unfamiliar in IAEA forums, 4 would transfer the current
50SIPRI, supra, note 47, at 48.
"Ibid., at 49.
"Ibid.
"GLOBAL POLITICS, supra, note 23, at 88.
"See LovErr, supra, note 42, at 283; ATOMIC SA4EouARVs, supra, note 27, at 156-58.
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troupe of glorified accountants into an instrument of tremendous international
consequence. The most intelligent development would find highly-qualified
individuals of diplomatic stature who, assigned on a rotating basis to nuclear
plants of a particular global region, would become experts on the nuclear energy
problems of their region. With the introduction of more and more reprocessing
plants where diversion may be possible in a matter of hours, such residence
becomes vital. Experts within the IAEA have indeed admitted that resident
inspection will become necessary when nuclear activity reaches a certain
thresholds.5 It seems apparent that efforts to define that threshold must be made
immediately. Obviously the resident concept entails a large increase in the
inspection staff. Even without resident inspection such an increase is needed and
long overdue; the IAEA will soon become meaningless without it.
Inherent in a vitalization of the IAEA must be careful evaluation of the quality
of current safeguard practice. Reform in this area, however, lies in more technical
sectors which are not immediate concerns of this investigation. The legal
challenge of safeguards lies more in examination of their general scope. The
integrated transnational control called for by present development must attend
allthe dangers of international nuclear activity. The diversion focus undoubtedly
should remain the major concern of such efforts. Yet the institutions which
ardently worked for these safeguards must be convinced to take the next step in
the progression of global nuclear responsibility. Entailed in this redefinition of
safeguards must be jurisdiction over hazardous aspects of uranium mining and
processing, transportation of nuclear materials, and waste disposal.
The final basic change needed in the IAEA would breathe vitality into the
image of the Agency as a control organ: the promotional aspect of the Agency
must be divorced from the more vital control function. A division parallel to that
of the old AEC into the NRC and ERDA is in order. As demonstrated by that U.S.
change, the separation itself need not be painful; the existing promotional
network can and should remain intact and reshaped into a parallel organization
of exclusively promotional interests. In the final analysis, promotion must
become a secondary concern; it has taken on a life of its own which needs no
extrinsic support. Conversely, control functions must be heavily supported and
quite deliberately developed. An international control agency can ill afford to
juggle two roles: its business must be control and control alone.
Throughout the context of these IAEA reforms must lie a spirit of strong
international authority. International ownership of fissionable materials must be
pushed to the foremost of concerns; it becomes almost necessary to viable control.
Perhaps even more effective, and more practical, would be the establishment of
international reprocessing centers. Only when the fissionable material of all
SSAToMIC SAFEGUARDS, supra, note 27, at 157.
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nations must be reprocessed by an international authority can the world be
assured that reprocessed materials are not improperly employed. Attempted
misuse would thus result in the cutoff of reprocessed fuel to the offender, an
effective sanction when no such fuel is otherwise available. The concept is not
quixotic: the United States and the Soviet Union have led global discussions on
the problems of national reprocessing plants. Additionally, Secretary of State
Kissinger and the Director General of the IAEA have called for regional plants, a
substantial step in this direction, in international forums. 6
B. The "Ecology" of Nuclear Development
The inter-relatedness of the problems facing global control of nuclear
materials is inescapable. The issues adhering to the political and socio-economic
concerns of the field cannot be severed for each in turn affects the other. This is
the bottom line in transnational energy management. Any solution that addresses
only one of these sectors is doomed. What is called for is a legal spirit which will
respond to the myriad global interests, an eclectic approach which balances them
with the maturity called for by the nuclear age. What is called for is a "nuclear
ecology."
Just as ecology recognizes that the biological systems are inevitably connected,
the law must recognize that the institutions and interests of the consumer, of the
politician, the environmentalist, the administrator, and the world citizen are
interlocked. Answers cannot look exclusively toward facilitating administration
without ignoring the interests of the citizen and consumer; the environmentalist
cannot cling to one institution which measures radiation leaks while from another
the politician secretly fashions the greatest pollution of all in the form of a bomb.
The analogy fits best with regard to ecology's vital interest in the "costs" to the
entire cycle of life of isolated actions in one system. Just as environmental impact
statements have served to evaluate environmental costs of U.S. government
action, the world needs a mechanism by which the social, political, economic and
administrative costs, as well as the environmental costs of nuclear development,
are evaluated. This means that when a facility is proposed, sociological impact
statements as well as statements of the political, economic and administrative
costs-including the costs of non-action--should be reviewed by a single world
authority.17 Such statements not only would illuminate the role of the inter-
national legal sector but provide objective information for world
"Statement to ECOSOC, supra, note 38, at 2; New York Times, 29 Feb. 1976, at 2E, col. 1.
"As mentioned, an inherent element of this evaluative process must be the costs of non-develop-
ment, e.g., what would be the real costs of a nuclear power plant moratorium? The history of the
Alaska pipeline controversy evidences the value of such considerations: the years lost in unsuccess-
ful environmentalist attacks cost the U.S. an estimated balance of payments loss of over $25 billion.
For cogent discussion of this point, see HEumAN KAHN, Tnm NErr 200 YEARS 143 (1976).
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decision-makers. The experience with U.S. environmental statements could go
far in helping to streamline the process behind such reviews.
The concept in a sense is simply a paraphrase of Mansfield's prescription cited
at the outset of this discussion: as the usages of society become more complex, the
law must learn to integrate that complexity in "adapting to the various situations
of mankind." A strong world regulatory authority must be generated, an
authority which encompasses all the dangers of nuclear activity. The existing
authority is not cognizant of the larger issues surrounding its role. The
institutions behind those issues must affirm their links with one another.
V. Conclusions
Albert Einstein voiced wise concern over man's reaction to the age he had
fathered:
The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking,
and thus we drift to unparalleled catastrophe.s'
The foregoing discussion has sought to examine that change on a new level and
represent its huge challenge to transnational law. Current transnational controls
rest on unstable political winds and institutional placebos. They are inadequate.
Above all they lack the global maturity incumbent upon those inhabiting a
nuclear age.
The law must recognize and incorporate the many parts of the whole of nuclear
energy. Dialogue between the technological, political, socio-economic, and
administrative institutions involved is imperative. International structures must
be forced to manage the planet's total energy production in an integrated fashion
as nuclear energy control is eased from the hands of shortsighted diplomats. A
transnational legal movement is vital to the planet's future. National sovereignty
cannot and should not be rendered ineffective; but on questions involving the
environment, the peace, the energy cycles of the world it must recognize a greater
polity.
In practical concerns, the IAEA must be restructured, bringing an
enlargement to its inspection force and expanding its financial base while re-
evaluating safeguard application and scope. Inherent in such broad reordering
must be a divorce of the promotional role from the Agency. The IAEA can and
must become the vehicle of firm international control it was originally meant to
be.
The spirit of nuclear "ecology" called for is not the short-term political shuf-
fling which has characterized international controls. Rather it is a fresh,
"Quoted in Willrich, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts
World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968) at 1519.
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broadened perspective which builds upon the strengths of the IAEA and goes
beyond with an authority cognizant of the political, socio-economic, and
administrative problems involved, an authority using the interactions between
these problems to cultivate secure interdependence.
The drift bemoaned by Einstein must be stopped.
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